Schedule: Th 2-4:45
(Room 4357B, Public Policy Building)
NOTE: no meeting on Oct. 7 (will be rescheduled)

Course ID: 761407200 (email Raul if in need of PTE#)

This course is de rigueur for students of policy, planning, and anything to do with environmental advocacy. The course revolves around the mechanisms of social choice which society employs in determining the state of our environment. It covers topics ranging from interest group theory to the political economy of the disenfranchised. But one common theme is: why and how do environmental problems persist, in spite of the trillions we have spent over the last few decades?

We begin with a model of the commons wherein individuals, acting simply to further their personal welfare, wind up in a position that is worse-off for all. In this light, we study the logic of collective action and institutions to overcome this prisoners’ dilemma. Also, we examine the existence of a core of possible cooperative outcomes and strategies that may enable such cooperation to take place. These concepts will be discussed in the context of transboundary pollution and problems dealing with the management of common pool resources.

This leads to the necessity of state intervention in the various forms this may take. One avenue is the institution of property rights. We discuss the Coase theorem and analyze present-day programs patterned around it. We will inquire into the question of whether or not a "natural" system of rights exists and their equity implications, with an eye towards present-day market-based systems. We also want to dissect legislative and administrative processes for allocating these public goods. We find that theories of legislators and bureaucrats as political entrepreneurs can be useful in understanding how environmental policy is made. Are regulations written for the median or noncentrist voter? How extensive is administrative discretion, and what are the determinants of agency decisions?

Of particular interest is the logic of interest group activism. What principles guide the process of coalition formation, and what characterizes a winning coalition? Specifically, we will take up a case involving the preservation of urban habitat. We will use principles of the theory of groups to trace how coalitions formed and how the project evolves along with them. Lastly, we focus on the latent group of the disenfranchised and examine the dialectic of environmental justice more deeply. How do the politics of exclusion play out in the area of public health and environment? How can we go about reforming institutions as to bring about the meaningful participation of the hitherto excluded?

I. Environmental Quality as a Public Good

We begin with the analysis of prisoners’ dilemma problems, interpreted in the context of transboundary pollutants. We discuss how the presence of externalities and natural monopolies rationalize the intervention of the state. We take up some elementary concepts in game theory: strategic form games, equilibria, and repeated games that will useful in our analysis.

Readings: Mishan (1982), Davos and Lejano (1998): pp. 1-17

1. Market failures
2. The commons as an n-person game
3. Case study: negotiating greenhous gas emissions

II. The Prospect of Cooperation

We discuss theories of coalition formation, how groups overcome the free-rider phenomenon, and the forces that drive coalition formation. We also analyze the boundaries of cooperation: the core of cooperative outcomes that can be voluntarily maintained. We ask whether real-world commons problems are characterized by nonempty cores. We examine case studies ranging from fisheries to air quality to study how institutions develop.

Readings: Moe (1980), Davos and Lejano: pp. 18-25 (1999),
Ostrom (1994), Rose and Stevens (1996)

1. The logic of collective action
2. Cores of games with public goods (and bads)
3. Evolution of institutions for cooperative action

III. Systems for Collective Choice

We will discuss the various institutions involved in determining the allocation of public goods. This involves a relentless exchange of information between public and government. We look at the institution of private property as a possible solution, and analyze emissions trading programs with a critical eye. We also look at theories of legislative and bureaucratic behavior and use these to better understand the process of environmental policymaking. For example, does the theory of bureaucracies explain any underprovision (or overprovision) of environmental protection?

1. Property rights

Readings: Pearce and Turner (1990), Bromley (1991),

- The Coase theorem
- Equity of allocations
- Property/user rights and traditional communities
- Case studies:
i. emissions trading for criteria pollutants
ii. negotiating greenhouse gas emissions

2. Legislative/administrative government

Readings: Rosenbaum (1998). Johnson (1991), Niskanen (1994), Stevens (1993), Helland (1998)

- Ideology and polarization
- Political capture of the regulatory process
- Political economy of the bureaucracy

3. Interest groups and coalition theory

Readings: Maloney and McCormick (1988), Farber (1992),
Pashigian (1985), Greve and Smith (1992)

- Theories of coalition formation
- Sources of power, winning coalitions

4. The political economy of the disenfranchised

Readings: EPA (1992), Lavelle and Coyle (1993), Lazarus (1993),
Harvey (1996)

- The incidence of environmental risks
- The environmental justice debate: evidence, related processes
- The poverty/environment linkage

5.  Envisioning the future polity

Readings: Haughton (1999), Healey (1998)