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American Political Science Association
September 3, 2004
Chicago, Illinois

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I. The Problem of Creating Bridging Social Capital

Consider September 11th, 2001 and its aftermath. Consider that there are 80,000 gang members in Los Angeles. While considering the violence in the South Central or Korea town neighborhoods of Los Angeles, consider too the rigors of everyday life in Belfast, Cape Town, Ramallah, and Jerusalem. Consider all these cases and it is clear that among the most urgent problems facing the world today are conflicts over religion, race, and ethnicity. These conflicts arise as much within countries as between them. Democracy, economic development, and peace hang in the balance if we cannot find ways to work effectively across these divides. Color and class divide Americans. Religion and national aspirations divide the Northern Irish. Color and economic development divide South Africans. Identity and statehood divide Israelis and Palestinians. The solutions to such conflicts are complex and long in coming. Reducing these conflicts requires the stability of acceptable, even if imperfect, political agreements, and real reductions in daily violence perpetrated by agents of the state and by groups in civil society. But solutions to conflicts over religion, race, and ethnicity also depend on working across contested boundaries in everyday life, on building bridging social capital, to use the phrase now as well known in popular commentary as in academic discussion.

Our research focuses on the third of these solutions—building bridging social capital in everyday life. Our work focuses on the theoretical and practical question of how people with profound differences agree to work together, especially how they form organizations that explicitly bring them together across deep divides of history and values. We concentrate on the questions of why and how “concord organizations” form. Concord organizations bring together people with fundamentally opposing views or identities for the purpose of promoting civil society while recognizing group differences. They are durable sites for creating bridging social capital, especially but not exclusively at the community level. Creating bridging social capital is more difficult than creating bonding social capital, and as such, it is in shorter supply. But bridging social capital is an important activator, a social enzyme if you will, that allows the virtues of “pro-social”

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capital to be more easily translated into better economic growth, more efficient government, and more evenly available public goods, such as education.

The first objective of this paper is to propose an investment theory of collective action, which suggests why, given all the ordinary incentives to abjure contact with members of deeply disliked groups, concord organizations form. In brief, we argue that those who start concord organizations see themselves as social investors, requiring a positive, pro-social net return on their activities. They are not consumers who want to buy public goods at the lowest price. Because cross-community group formation is important for creating bridging social capital, **the second objective is to present the design principles that are necessary for successfully starting and running concord groups.** Design principles provide the structural and behavioral rules and norms that militate against the perpetual instability present in organizations comprised of people from antagonistic communities. These rules are necessary even, as is often the case, the participants in concord organizations are less antagonistic to their group's traditional enemies than is the norm for their group. The long shadow of history makes individual participation in concord organizations socially difficult, and sometimes personally dangerous.

To fulfill these objectives we locate the study of concord organizations within the research on social capital, summarize our research questions and methods, present the investment approach to collective action, and identify the design principles for successfully creating concord organizations. We conclude by discussing the importance of concord organizations to the creation of bridging social capital.

II. Concord Organizations and Social Capital Research

Concord Organizations

As mentioned, concord organizations bring together people with fundamentally opposing views or identities for the purpose of promoting civil society while recognizing group differences.² Concord organizations typically undertake one or all of the following tasks: dialogue programs, witness activities (that is, demonstrating a new future by living together or sharing scarce space), education or training, community service, conflict resolution, and economic development. The most long-lasting concord organizations go beyond dialogue programs. Examples of concord organizations include the 26 local initiatives of Common Ground for Life and Choice, dialogue organizations that bring together pro-choice and pro-life leaders in the United States; the 46 "integrated" schools in Northern Ireland that educate Catholic and Protestant children together; the Conflict Mediation Practice in South Africa, an organization that helps build skills in new, multiracial communities; Project Change Albuquerque, which founded the Project Change Fair Lending Center; and Neve Shalom/Wahat-al-Salam, a conscious community of Israeli Arabs and Jews living on a hilltop outside Jerusalem. Big or small, individual or one of many linked institutions, concord organizations require greater intentionality than the ordinary organization. They also require face-to-face interactions that allow cultural combatants to see each other as fully human.

The Landscape of Social Capital Research

How do concord organizations fit into the study of social capital? Social capital research has been a boom industry over the last decade, and its energy arises from the contributions of many social science disciplines and approaches. But the problems arising from this multiplicity of approaches are also well known, including uncertainties of levels of analysis, definitions, and data. Thus fitting the study of concord organizations into the landscape of social capital requires mapping, if only briefly, the terrain of each intellectual dispute.

Levels of analysis: The process of social capital formation occurs many levels—psychic, organizational, community, and societal. Our view is that the most serious problem facing the field is the difficulty of researching this process at all these levels simultaneously, especially using secondary survey or census data. We asked questions that cross many levels, hence our need for a case based methodology (see below). Specifically, we are interested in how individuals decide to create heterogeneous organizations in heterogeneous communities. The purposes of these organizations are to promote civil society while recognizing group differences. We consider the formation of these groups, the groups themselves, and their programs and products as part of the process of creating bridging social capital. We also recognize that creating bridging social capital is, at least at the community level, a virtuous circle, with causation running in both directions. The psychological frames that encourage seeking out “the other” and the decisions to create concord organizations or to participate in their programs reinforce one another. Similarly, bridging organizations prosper when basic political agreements exist and violence is declining, while also contributing to the strength of both of these conditions.

Definitions: Definitions are a helpful beginning, although there are now about as many definitions of social capital as there are coffee drinks at Star Bucks, as reviews by Grootaert and his colleagues; Narayan; and Woolcock show.³ In *Better Together*, *Bowling Alone*, and *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam and Putnam and Felstein provide the most widely used definition of social capital as “networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance, and trustworthiness.”⁴ But there are other approaches as well. In particular, economists working in the game theoretic tradition of rational egoists see social capital as the propensity to be communally cooperative without supporting knowledge, what game theorists call “altruism”.⁵

We define social capital somewhat differently, trying to encompass all the levels at which the activity occurs. *Social capital* is the organizational, personal, and relational resources available to facilitate collective life and solve social problems. Both *bonding* social capital, which amplifies shared identities, histories and view points, and *bridging* social capital, which spans different ones, are created and maintained by interactions with others, especially within formal organizations and informal groups.⁶ Our approach to social capital is distinguished by two characteristics. First, we operationalize social capital in many intrinsically linked forms, some more tangible than others. Psychological

“frames”⁷ or approaches to problems are one component of social capital, but other components include individual and collective skills, relationships and their histories and expectations, and organizational structures that hold values, establish rules, and sustain work necessary for social problem solving. Our approach to social capital focuses more on the groups and organizations that hold and nurture it than do many other definitions. Highly relational definitions of social capital always seem a bit like nets adrift in a sea, unattached to the boats and fishers who will bring in the catch. Our research shows that organizations that create the physical and value spaces that let cross-community relationships develop are very important in creating bridging social capital.

Data: The problems of studying a social process occurring at every level of analysis, with many different definitions, is compounded by the lack of primary data that address each level. Much of the research has used secondary analysis of survey or census data. It is not easy to determine an individual’s psychological frame shaping his or her approach to working in cross-community groups through existing survey data. Similarly it is rarely possible to determine whether the organizations to which people belong have bridging objectives or capacities. Working successfully across communities also requires considerable social and problem solving skills. Political and social surveys rarely identify and measure these skills.

These limitations are the natural result of using data that are either gathered for other purposes or gathered early in the study of social capital, when the distinctive importance of bridging was not as well determined. One of the best approaches to gathering social capital data is being developed by the World Bank, which explicitly looks for bridging and bonding experiences among household members. The “Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital”, designed mostly to be used in poor countries, measures groups and networks, trust and solidarity, collective action and cooperation, information and communication, social cohesion and inclusion, and empowerment and political action.⁸ It does not, to our knowledge, contain measures of personal optimism and optimism about one’s group, however.

As a result of these limitations, research on social capital using survey and census data has for the most part not distinguished between its bonding and bridging forms. Thus, general studies of social capital fail to capture the distinct contributions of each. Because bonding social capital is so much more prevalent in all societies, and bridging social capital is harder to create, most studies of social capital are really investigations of bonding arrangements, with bridging being left out or constituting “noise.” This problem may account for some, but surely not all, of the recent findings that show that group membership is not always related to the positive consequences ascribed to social capital in early research. An exception to this trend is the analysis by Stolle and Rochon which imaginatively attempts to assess the diversity of associations (from our perspective a useful first proxy for bridging capacities) and found that associational diversity encourages generalized trust and involvement in community reciprocity.⁹

Research Findings

The earliest research on social capital showed that increased social capital, measured most frequently by indices combining trust and civic engagement, promoted better political and economic outcomes. For example, in the midst of several decades of decline in civic activity and in trust in American leaders and institutions, Putnam found that communities with higher level of social capital had higher levels of political participation and more economic advantages.¹⁰ In other studies, higher social capital was associated with more effective political institutions, more robust economic development and lower incidences of social problems such as teen pregnancy and delinquency.¹¹ For instance, Saegert, Winkel, and Swartz found that three aspects of social capital, including membership in tenant associations, pro-social norms among tenants, and the structure of the building's governance organization, all reduced crime in mostly minority low-income housing in New York City.¹²

But the general finding relating higher social capital—both trust and group participation—to better social outcomes was challenged almost immediately. Three lines of research delved deeper into the early findings. The first approach concentrated on the role of trust versus group membership, the second focused on the role of communal homogeneity and social capital formation, and the third investigated the importance of institutions in fostering higher levels of social capital formation.

First, trust was more important than extensive group membership in promoting improved government and economic and performance. Knapp found that reciprocity in the form of trust, volunteering, and census responses, were associated with better government performance in American states, whereas group membership was not.¹³ Knapp and Keefer found that membership in formal organizations did not predict improved economic performance in 29 market economies, but “trust and civic norms are stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain predatory actions of chief executives, and with better educated and ethnically homogeneous populations.”¹⁴ Ulsaner, looking at the problem from the other direction, argued that higher levels of social equality lead to higher levels of generalized trust.¹⁵

Second, heterogeneous communities had lower levels of social capital. Both diversity itself and inter-group conflict created barriers to the virtuous circle of higher social capital and better performance. Putnam found these results in the early analysis of the Social Capital Community Benchmarks data.¹⁶ So too, Easterly and Ross found that ethnolinguistic fractionalization greatly reduced African growth rates in the post-colonial period.¹⁷ In a comprehensive review of the economic literature on social capital, Costa and Kahn found universally that “more homogeneous communities foster greater levels of social capital production.”¹⁸ Hero examined social capital and racial inequality in America. He concluded that to the extent that increased social capital was associated with greater economic equality, “that association occurs only or mostly in the white population and/or around social class issues.”¹⁹ Importantly, heterogeneous organizations appear to counteract the deleterious effects of heterogeneous communities. The work of Stolle and Rochan, reported earlier, suggests that heterogeneous associations promote generalized trust and reciprocity.

Third, institutional capacities at the government level and organizational design at the group level can help to overcome the problems that communal diversity imposes on social capital formation. Importantly, in divided societies stronger institutional capacities are associated with better policy and social outcomes including more equal investment in education between favored and disfavored ethnic groups, better levels of economic growth, and lower levels of inter-communal violence. In a large cross-country analysis, Easterly found that in countries with “sufficiently” good institutions; as measured by freedom from government repudiation of contracts, freedom from expropriation, functioning rule of law, and fair bureaucratic norms; ethnic diversity did not lower growth or worsen economic policies.²⁰ This work changed his earlier conclusions in research with Levine, which did not include institutional quality variables. When institutional variables are added, they protect societies from the original finding that ethnic interest group polarization leads to rent-seeking and reduces the demand for public goods. Varshney found similar results in his work on ethnic violence in India. Communities that had institutions that brought Hindus and Muslims together—for example, the traditional multi-communal Congress party—had lower levels of violence. Merely socializing privately across groups was not as predictive of tranquil group relations as was the existence of cross-community groups.²¹

III. Research Questions and Design

As survey and census research shows, heterogeneous communities have a deficit of social capital. Similarly, bridging social capital is especially scarce in divided communities. But importantly, both political rules and local organizational capacities are particularly valuable in providing social benefits to divided communities. Our research questions arise from these findings: How do cross-community organizations with their potential to generate bridging social capital form? How do concord organizations start against the odds of daily conflict among racial, ethnic, and religious groups defined by too much particularistic history and too little common future?

This question is important both theoretically and practically. Theories of collective action, especially those following the work of Mancur Olson in *The Logic of Collective Action*, demonstrate that it is hard enough to create organizations when potential members have unity of interest. How much harder it must be to start organizations with members who belong to groups with historic hatreds. Practically, it was clear from the outset that concord organizations would embody the chronic instability of managing rather than resolving long-term conflicts members brought to their organizational participation. In her studies of the management of common pool resources, Ostrom breathed life into the practical as well as theoretical study of organizations with chronic instabilities. She noted that individual fishers or foresters had incentives to over-fish or to cut too many trees unless the group of fishers or foresters developed rules in practice about sharing common pool resources.²² Likewise, we felt it was important for us to determine what organizational design principles—the rules in practice—encourage people to create concord organizations, especially so because concord organizations produce neither public goods nor use common pool resources.

The Concord Project researched over 100 concord organizations. For each we created an extensive dossier from the written record of its founding, history, projects, and accomplishments. (A list of the cases is found in Appendix A.) The organizations were either nonprofits (NGOs in international parlance) or quasi-autonomous public agencies like integrated schools in Northern Ireland or the statutorily independent Human Rights Commission in South Africa. In addition, we did site visits to more than half the organizations, in some cases several site visits to the same organization, as well as interviewed political leaders, academics, and community activists whose knowledge help to embed the groups in their local contexts. At least two people participated in two-thirds of the site visits. Our objective was to determine the motivations for starting groups, the prices people paid, the opportunity costs for inaction as well as action, the benefits they and others received, the settings in which their group formation occurred, the techniques they used to keep their groups in existence and successful, and the kind and extent of the “products” each group provided. Over 300 interviews were conducted.

The research had two stages, and the research design reflects that history. The first stage was the identification of American concord organizations. In this stage, we chose organizations on the basis of the kind of conflict they faced. We categorized conflicts as primarily racial and ethnic, or religious, or ideological. As our understanding of bridging capital grew, we also chose organizations on the basis of the kinds of work they undertook: dialogue only or actions beyond dialogue. Because we were interested in group formation, we made a specific decision to emphasize free-standing concord organizations rather than concord projects within other organizations. Thus we did not research activities such as Black-Jewish dialogues sponsored by local chapters of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) or religious congregations, even though these efforts are important to the stock of bridging social capital, and they are not easy to initiate. By investigating free-standing organizations we set the highest bar against collective action, believing that we would learn more about collective action from especially difficult cases. In some instances, the organizations we studied did not endure beyond three or four years—in essence, they ended up being like independent concord projects. But at least at the outset there was some commitment to durable, if not permanent, independent organizations by the groups we studied.

Once the first wave of U.S. institutions had been studied, we approached our major funder, the Kellogg Foundation, with a proposal to look at bridging organizations in countries with higher levels of communal conflict. The second stage of the project was the extension of this research to Northern Ireland, and South Africa, where intensive interviewing was done, and a proposal to do research in Palestine (then mostly called the Palestinian Territories) and Israel. The escalation of violence due to the collapse of the Oslo process made it impossible to do research according to our protocol in Israel or Palestine. Our protocol required the establishment of permanent organizations that allowed people from antagonistic groups to meet and often to work together. That cross-boarder type of activity has become virtually impossible between Israel and Palestine. Concord organizations exist within Israel among its Jewish, Arab, and Druze citizens, but they did not always meet our protocol. In the end, therefore, we chose to research Israeli

and Palestinian concord organizations that also worked in the United States, where both Israelis and Palestinians could meet, though often with difficulty.

IV. An Investment Theory of Collective Action

Psychology Laboratories and Church Basements

Our objective was to learn how both the micromobilization of small groups of people and the macromobilization of resources helped to create concord organizations. We began with the hypothesis that the thin rationality of self-interested, rational egoists would not be an accurate characterization of the people who founded concord organizations. In 1965, Mancur Olson wrote “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.”²³ This argument against individual contributions to public goods came to be known as the “zero contribution thesis.” A great deal of attention has been directed at what kind of coercion, side payments, or rules lead people to create collective goods against their rational self interest as defined by the price of the public good.

The translation of Olson’s argument into n-person prisoner’s dilemma games by Hardin solidified the notion that cooperation without communication was dangerous to self interest.²⁴ Somewhat later, Axelrod showed that signaling and multiple iterations of games could lead to cooperation under certain circumstances.²⁵ Ostrom and others also began to report on the variety of ways different players approached prisoner’s dilemma games. She described two kinds of “norm-using” rather than rational egoist players, that is, “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers.”²⁶

While one set of scholars was examining the structure of cooperation in highly controlled experiments, another set was engaged in field research. C.P. Snow could hardly have imagined more disparate worlds of inquiry than those who designed experiments in university psychology labs and those whose knowledge drew from long experience with meetings in church basements.²⁷ The social movement scholars examined in detail the social processes of mobilization into collective action. David Snow and his colleagues argued that “frames” or schemata of interpretation “organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective.” They argued that developing a meaningful frame—“frame alignment” in their terms—was a precondition for micromobilization.²⁸ Tarrow and later Mayer and Staggenborg identified the macropolitical and macroeconomic conditions that fostered group formation, by arguing for policy windows and political opportunity structures created the structural preconditions of group action and helped to explain both the rise of communal or interest groups, and the cycles of group activities.²⁹

Investment versus Consumption

The results of our work leads us to propose an investment theory of collective action. In brief, we argue that collective action to create concord groups, and most likely more generally, requires the adoption of an investment and not a consumption frame.

The classical theory of collective action is consumerist. When considering contributing to public goods, *The Logic of Collective Action* states that no one will rationally pay for what he or she could get for free, unless he or she is bound by the norms of cooperation in small groups or is rewarded by selective incentives. In other words, potential collective actors are price sensitive.

We argue differently. We suggest that potential collective actors are sensitive to the net rate of return on their investment, not the cost. The logic of investment and production is different from the logic of consumption. Specifically, the founders of concord organizations calculate a pro-social interest rate which includes the net returns on their participation in creating the organization, the experiential and material gains provided as private goods by the organization, and the highly valued externalities the organization produces. The investment theory of collective action robustly explains the creation of concord organizations in settings of both moderate communal conflict (United States) and intense communal conflict (Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel and Palestine), and gives insight into collective action more generally. An investment approach to collective action also integrates some aspects of experimental, survey-based, and the ethnographic research traditions, while raising new questions.

As it relates to starting concord organizations, the investment theory of collective action has five parts. The first is an understanding of the setting in which this kind of collective action occurs, that is, the political opportunity structure which makes up the resources for and barriers to macromobilization. The second is an understanding of type of goods concord organizations produce. The third is the limit of thin price rationality and the importance of the investment frame to micromobilization. The fourth is the iterative nature of collective action. And the fifth is the importance of institutional “incubators” and “banks” in holding partially completed collective action, and ultimately supporting the work that concord organizations do.

Political Opportunity Structures: *What characterizes the political opportunity structure that leads to the impetus to create organizations that work across communities riven with antagonistic divisions and histories of violence?* Our research shows that concord organizations tend to form when two conditions are met. The first is the dissatisfaction with the status quo, often defined as the inability to win unequivocally longstanding cultural or political conflicts over values and identities. The second quality of the opportunity structure is a sense not so much of “no exit” but of narrow doorways through which chances for new conversations and social arrangements are available. In situations defined by recursive loops of non-agreement, mistrust, or violence, narrow doorways are not to be ignored. After twenty years of intense public conflict, a quiet non-public way to find a better way to talk about abortion made local Common Ground for Life and Choice groups, and other, spontaneous abortion dialogues seem like an opportunity that tired opponents could not afford to miss.

Will concord organizations, by themselves, create the political and social changes necessary to end long-standing conflicts? No. Without the two larger conditions that we noted, reasonably stable and acceptable political arrangements and reasonably low levels

of violence by the state and communal actors, concord organizations have trouble forming or enduring. Concord organizations are not a substitute for peace negotiations, good power sharing arrangements, and state and communal restraint. The state must be strong and committed to solving racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts, and outside entities—other countries, NGOs, supranational entities like the EU and the UN—must play their brokering roles. Historically, concord organizations have sometimes acted as homes for developing larger political settlements or significant social change, but that is not their primary role.

Types of Goods: *What types of goods do concord organizations produce?* Our first observation is that collective action and collective (public) goods tend to be used to mean the same thing in everyday social science conversations. It is important to remember that they are distinct. All group formation—for private and public goods—faces some aspects of the collective action dilemma. For example, three friends who have complementary skills and assets and who want to start a new genetic engineering firm where they own all the stock still face the possibility of shirking, free riding, or duplicity, hence the need for contract law, transparency, joint fiscal liability as well as joint rewards, and other enforcing mechanisms. Collective action for public goods makes these problems worse because the benefit is available to all equally and the consumption of the good by others does not diminish its supply. Thus the workers at the widget plant who want higher wages through unionization must create the union—an organization—through collective action. The union, in turn, provides a public good, the union wage. Free riding is most serious in collective action for public goods. In Olson's price-sensitive approach, each worker wants to "buy" the union wage at the cheapest individual cost, and therefore each has an incentive to free ride, knowing she or he can get the union wage for free if others create the union.

Thus it is important to know what kind of goods concord organizations produce. It is interesting to note how many times in discussions of The Concord Project the first assumption is that a concord organization produced public goods. This is not accurate. Concord organizations produce value-based experiential and (occasionally) material private goods, with highly valued pro-social externalities.

Each part of this description deserves more attention. The value-based rather than economic quality of many of the goods provided by concord organizations is crucial to understanding the dilemmas of their formation and successful maintenance. Remember concord organizations bring together people from antagonistic communities to work together for the common good, while still recognizing their permanent differences. Most concord organizations bridge racial, ethnic, or religious differences—values based on identity and belief.

Conflicts around identity and belief are frequently different in nature from conflicts over economic interests. By and large economic interests are divisible, and in some instances, substitutable. Conflicts over economic interests are subject to resolution through basic problem solving techniques like changing the price, splitting the difference, finding a proportional solution, taking turns, or trading for something else that is also

valued. Methods for solving economic problems also often have institutionalized rules, such as those that govern markets. Identity and value conflicts rarely have these qualities—as one of our interviewees said, “Either the Pope is the Vicar of Christ or he is not, but he cannot be the Vicar of Christ on even days but not odd days.” Values-based conflicts are rarely divisible or substitutable, although they are amenable to being modified by additional, overarching values.

But even though the activities of concord organizations are located in the nondivisibility of competing values, the goods they provide are, by and large, private. When members of Corrymeela, a Northern Irish cross-community training organization, hold retreats to help Catholic/nationalist and Protestant/unionist understand and respect each other, there is no sense that the history of the conflict will go away. The experience of being Catholic or Protestant in Northern Ireland is greater than any weekend retreat can assuage. But the value that is provided by the retreat is first and foremost a value that goes to participants. Similarly, when the Project Change Fair Lending Center in Albuquerque makes loans available to people of color where such loans were difficult or impossible before, the advantage is quite specific to the borrower, even as the action challenges the history of red-lining. Likewise, when The Conflict Mediation and Transformation Practice mediates between ethnically based taxi companies whose violent competition is both reducing transportation in poor neighborhoods and exposing the community to danger, the taxi companies come out with a new plan for operation, and the community is safer.

In *Shifting Involvements*, Hirschman suggested that participation itself is a value in group formation.³⁰ Rather than considering participation a cost, he considered it a benefit. This is undoubtedly true for those who create concord organizations. But it is also true that those who create concord organizations highly value their positive externalities—especially the likelihood of ripple effects that make a community or society more deliberative, tolerant, and future oriented. The purpose of abortion dialogues was to increase the responsibility of all parties for their rhetoric and actions. Talking together reduced the great temptation for those on each side to demonize each other, an important outcome, as demons are outside the realm of obligation.³¹ By coming to trust each other through the dialogues, even as they continued to disagree profoundly, activists often extended their new relations to activities outside the dialogue. For example, pro-life protesters outside abortion clinics alerted abortion service providers that potentially violent newcomers had joined their ranks. Rather than wanting to keep all the value for the members of the group, the founders of concord organizations are gratified when they watch the ripples move outward from their actions.

Investment Rather Than Consumption: *Why don't individuals who want the benefits of having concord organizations and their programs just free ride—that is, wait until the organization is formed and then join it or participate in its programs?* Well certainly, some do. Indeed, some concord organizations start so that they can offer programs, therefore participation by others in programs is not considered free riding by the founders, although it might be by the participants.

The real question is why do those who create concord organizations engage in collective action? If ever there were organizations that should not form, concord organizations fit the bill. Unlike the prospective union members, unlike prospective members of a congregation, political party, or bowling league, possible members of concord organizations do not have unity of interest. When Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious leaders were considering whether to share space in Interfaith Centers in the Columbia Maryland they had to contend with deep divisions of theology and practice. Columbia was established by the Rouse Corporation in the 1960s, as a wholly planned new community. Its statutes prevented the building of independent religious buildings within the town, although religious congregations could erect shared buildings together on land provided by the company. Jews, Catholics, and Protestants are lionized in the civic discourse as contributing to the Judeo-Christian values on which America is founded. In actual fact, though, the history of relations among the faiths reflects as much bitter conflict as it does respect. The fact that Jews do not believe that Christ is the Messiah, and that various Protestant denominations and Catholics have insuperable disagreements about the nature of communion and the role of the laity in choosing religious leaders (just to name a few issues) did not bode well for the establishment of shared religious buildings—including *shared sanctuaries*—which would need to be jointly financed.

Each congregation could have built its own building outside the boundaries of Columbia, but none did in the first three decades of Columbia's history. At the founding of Columbia, a score of clergy overcame their lack of unity of interest, in this case, their lack of similar theology and practice, the potential reluctance of their congregants, and the quite real objections of the hierarchy in their denominations. They overcame what we call the "*no takers problem*," that is, the problem that people separated by antagonistic views or identities rarely want to form a joint organization. From a birds-eye view, the structure of antagonistically divided communities reveals separations of such importance that most if not all possible members of concord organizations do not have enough unity of interest for it to be "rational" for them to free ride. Analytically, the "no takers" problem temporally precedes the free rider problem.

The first on-the-ground task of the founders of concord organizations is to find and promote the adoption of an overarching value deeply desired by some members of antagonistic groups and to mobilize for collective action around that value. The value can be abstract, such as a belief in all people being children of God, or concrete, such as wanting your children to be able to walk to school safely. Indeed, it was the belief that all people are children of God that kept the Columbia clergy working on creating the Columbia Interfaith Centers. Saving money was important, but it was not the primary lubricant of their agreement. The task the Columbia clergy engaged in is reframing for micromobilization. After much discussion about their problems and concerns, they decided to demonstrate in practice one of the highest tenants of each of their faiths, God's encompassing love for everyone.

The kind of reframing required to start concord organizations does not fit neatly within the categories of bridging^b, amplification, extension, and transformation already found in the literature. Instead, the collective action to create concord organizations requires adding a new frame, that is, the addition of the overarching uniting value, while also balancing the divisive values, which do not disappear. We call the schemata needed to start a concord organization a “*balancing frame*”, because it must balance the overarching shared belief and the continuing antagonistic beliefs.

The mechanism for creating balancing frames that allows for the creation of concord organizations is the idea of pro-social net interest rates. People who engage in collective action to create concord organizations are investors. They are more attentive to interest rates than prices. Virtually every person we interviewed said that she or he thought of starting the abortion dialogue, the integrated Northern Irish school, a South African conflict mediation program, and every other group, because she or he saw it as an important and urgent investment. They did not think primarily about the price of collective action; they thought about the return rate of collective action. They were investors not consumers. They recognized the danger, the pleasures, the obstacles, the immediate costs, the opportunity costs, and the benefits of action—even if they could not perfectly calculate each component. In particular, they were attentive to the opportunity costs of the status quo, that is, of not acting, which they considered to have a high and enduring price.

As they moved toward collective action, potential participants wanted their actions to be worthwhile. In analytical terms, the founders of concord organizations wanted the private experiential and material goods plus desired externalities only available through collective action. They made a subjective calculation of the rate of return—they did not invest in concord ventures that they thought would fail. In this general and ordinary sense of the word, they were rational. But this is a “thick rationality” of actions linked deeply to their settings, and to personal and cultural histories and values. Prospective collective actors also recognized something not discussed in the collective action literature—that they would be first in line for some private goods (for example, their children could go to the integrated schools they started), and that this queuing advantage was worth having.³² But mostly what they wanted was a good return on their effort in terms of the building blocks of a heterogeneous democracy: acknowledgment, legitimization, understanding, and new options. People with grown children or with no children worked to create integrated schools in Northern Ireland. They believed in democratic accommodation of value-based conflicts.

The pro-social net interest rate of founders of concord organizations was comprised of tangible and intangible private benefits for themselves and the manifestation of those values in the externalities, the ripple effects, they desired. They did not have a narrow or cramped sense of value, based mostly on money or personal advantage. Rather, like good interest-based bargainers, they valued lots of different kinds

^b A “bridging” frame, as discussed by David Snow and his colleagues, does not mean the development of a cross-community organizing schemata. A bridging frame is defined as linking “two or more ideologically unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem.” (p. 467).

of benefits and were willing, in fact, clever about the psychological aggregation of those benefits into a subjective rate of return. Some of the benefits were immediately personal, including the enjoyment of having created the organization, the solidarity, the problems solving, and the esteem associated with promoting the overarching value. Some of the benefits were material, such as the ability to send your children to an integrated school or being able to ride a taxi in safety. Some of the benefits were highly valued externalities like knowing that those who would participate in a cross-community skills training class would contribute to a different mode of community problem solving. Moreover, each person participating in the starting a concord organization could and did have a somewhat different set of values in his or her pro-social interest rate. There was a notable discount against this interest rate in forming concord organizations—the likely reaction of members of one’s home group who were suspicious of cross-group activity. But this too, was figured in the psychological calculations around the decision to invest.

Step By Step: *What gives investors confidence that their efforts are worth the resources used?* The answer to this question is found in the inevitably large number of steps it takes to create an organization. It takes many steps to create a concord organization, union, or firm. People have to discuss and agree upon objectives, program, governance, participation and financing. For concord organizations, in particular, the founders of groups need to find ways to magnify the overarching value that keeps them together, even as other social forces pull them apart. At each step individuals can assess if their investment is likely to provide their return. This means that collective actors can leave if the return is not high enough, especially if the values embodied in the work are not congruent with their own. In addition, the iterative process of group formation means that groups with good decision making and social processes are more likely to form.

Institutional Incubators and Banks: *What keeps a nascent group together as it works out its organizational structure?* If it takes time to work out the problems of group formation and to see if the investment is worthwhile, it also requires institutional incubators and banks to hold the interim agreements. Interim committees (and their notes), meetings at neighbors’ homes, sponsoring organizations which help with funds or neutral places to meet, and facilitators from outside organizations all hold the institution building process together. Walker recognized the importance of sponsoring organizations in creating interest groups.³³ So too, Chowdhury and Nelson identified the crucial character of sponsorship in starting informal as well as formal women’s organizations.³⁴ The shelter of such sponsorship allows potential collective actors to be more imaginative and to have the time needed to work out their agreements. Individuals creating a concord organization often express a spirit of organizational experimentation, careful intentionality about forms, and a willingness to create a larger organizational repertoire that is new to this conflict, though not necessarily new to organizational problem solving writ large. Together, they frequently see themselves as thoughtfully breaking the rules of the dance of engagement between the parties.³⁵

The organization building stage is especially vulnerable to external shocks. We said earlier that building bridging social capital required a macropolitical opportunity structure that included reasonably stable and acceptable political arrangements and

reasonably low levels of state and communal violence. Part of the reason for these conditions is that members of antagonistic groups need to work face to face—something that is very hard if it is too dangerous to go to a meeting. Additionally, these conditions let people have longer psychological time lines, a component of figuring the likelihood of future returns on investments. Just as hyperinflation reduces economic entrepreneurship and economic growth, political instability and violence reduce collective action—especially cross-community efforts—because they shorten time horizons and impose high short-term costs.³⁶

V. Design Principles and Necessary Practices

Collective actors creating concord organizations see themselves as investors who need an adequate net pro-social interest rate. How can such a return rate be created in organizations that by their nature have the instability of members from antagonistic groups? Step by step, concord organizations must develop the interim organizational forms that allow a balancing frame turn into a functioning group. Once started, the concord organization becomes a social bank where cross-communities ideals, skills, and programs are held. Because they are social banks, they need rules in practice for protecting their assets. As Ostrom, Knapp, Knapp and Keefer, and Stolle and Rochon demonstrate, the structure of institutions and their rules are crucial to creating social capital. Successful concord organizations develop structures and behaviors that manage enduring pressures that keep people from antagonistic groups from seeing the connection between their personal and common interests and therefore investing in their joint futures.

This section identifies ten organizational elements common to strong concord organizations. The first four are “design principles” which are structural and normative elements. The remaining six are “necessary practices,” that is, essential ways to enact the design principles. (Chart 1 provides a summary of these principles and practices). Strong concord organizations use all these principles and practices as an integrated whole. **Because of the tension between the overarching shared value and the enduring antagonistic ones, concord organizations are perpetually in creation mode. Thus the rules in practice for engaging in collective action to create a concord organization also become the rules in practice for maintaining cross-community work.** The fact that organizations that build bridging social capital are always in costly formation mode may help to explain the scarcity of bridging social capital.

1. Design Principle: Promote Overarching Values.

Successful concord organizations find and continually enhance overarching shared values. In fact, this is the first task of concord organizations. The founders of such organizations, through a series of small, transformational encounters, often discover these shared values by getting to know individuals from other communities. They learn that they share generalized overarching beliefs that bridge their differences.

The creation of the first integrated school in Northern Ireland is a good example of finding an overarching value—educating children together for a better life together. The founders of Lagan College, as it was ultimately called, were drawn in part from a group of Catholic families who sent their children to Protestant schools, because the Protestant schools were closer to home or perceived as better for their children. But there were significant problems, not the least of which was that Catholic children were often “passing” in these Protestant schools and they were required to take a Protestant-oriented religious curriculum. Catholic parents first identified themselves by, very bravely, allowing Mass cards to peek out of pockets or purses or bags so that other Catholic parents could identify them. One or two Catholics had, unusually, Protestant friends who had worked outside of Northern Ireland and were conversant with religiously integrated education and who were willing to discuss integrated education in Northern Ireland. Bit by bit they explored and reinforced their belief that educating their children together was immensely valuable. They did so even in the face of significant religious and political conflicts. And they did so at a time when there were tens of thousands of British troops in Northern Ireland and no direct rule.

2. Design Principle: Balance Bridging and Bonding Values.

Concord organizations have two enduring sets of values, bridging and bonding, and these values are always in contest within the members of organizations. Therefore, successful concord organizations deal with issues that divide their members as well as issues that bind them. Said another way, concord organizations do not avoid conflicts; they contextualize them together. They help people to hold several competing views of the same problem simultaneously and to keep the shared view in the ascendancy in their organizational work.

The late John Wallach, the founder of Seeds of Peace, which runs a summer camp for children from divided communities including the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, described the demands of this balancing act. The three-week program recognizes the stages its campers go through. In the first week, the youngsters are either unwarrantedly idealistic or completely certain their side is right. In the second week, they begin to see that there might be other views and why people might hold them. In the third week, Wallach reported that the campers “realize that they have to deal with the hatred and still need to accept each other anyway.”³⁷ The Seeds of Peace International Camp would fail if it had a jolly “we are all one under the skin” approach. In this way, the camp recognizes that it cannot succeed in its mission if it does not acknowledge what divides campers as well as what unites them.

3. Design Principle: Establish Rules of Engagement.

The most successful concord organizations do not rush to action without attention to rule making in organizational life. They begin with well-stated democratic decision making mechanisms, with specific attention to leadership transition and to basic mechanisms of solving future conflicts.

Genesis, the shared religious space of St. Clare Episcopal Church and Temple Beth Emeth, has successfully undertaken a capital campaign for and the building of an extension for educational and community activities. This expansion was made possible by open and transparent decision-making rules embodied in a joint council established in the by-laws when the congregations decided to share space and by the deliberative and consultative processes the two congregations and the joint council undertook. In contrast, another group of congregations sharing buildings has increasingly functioned like a religious condominium with multiple tenants, in part because the original founders thought that their good intentions alone would be sufficient to deal with any conflicts in the future.

4. Design Principle: Recognize and Reward Investment.

Successful concord organizations foster an organizational culture of social investment. People involved in concord organizations see themselves first and foremost as investors, not consumers, and they recognize and reward investment. They understand the long historical time frames of their conflicts and are realistic about the kinds of efforts necessary to bring about change. They see the organizations they form as “banks” that hold and reinforce the often-fragile visions for a better, shared future. They cultivate a hardheaded hopefulness.

Some of the investments concord organizations make are monetary. The grants given by The Abraham Fund or the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland are concrete examples of financial investment in interethnic community organizations. But most investments are more intangible—skills, relationships, new worldviews, and cross-community activities to solve shared problems. The Conflict Mediation and Transformation Practice mediated a violent conflict between ethnic gangs running competing taxi services in Cape Town. These taxis are crucial for economic well being in poor neighborhoods with very limited public transportation and few cars. Many concord organizations demonstrate their commitment to investment by running programs for young people. The high school training programs of Facing History and Ourselves and Leadership Development in Intergroup Relations are just two of many examples. The investment approach is also illustrated by the many concord organizations that act as incubators for new initiatives, spinning them off rather than growing themselves. For instance, Corrymeela spun off TIDES Training (Transformation, Interdependence, Diversity, Equality and Sustainability)—an organization dedicated to continuing concord initiatives after European Union funding stops, and Future Ways, which finds practical and human ways people can work together in a society emerging from conflict.

5. Necessary Practice: Prevent Proselytizing.

Successful concord organizations develop techniques where members can hold their views, but do not seek to impose them on others. Strong norms against proselytizing are important both organizationally and personally. Organizationally, strong norms against proselytizing keep the values that bridge viewpoints in the ascendancy, thus preventing organizations from drowning in the whirlpool of contested

views. An individual's commitment not to proselytize demonstrates a profound and concrete recognition of the legitimacy of the people who hold views fundamentally different, and often in opposition, to one's own. The self-restraint involved in not proselytizing becomes a basis for a larger social practice of restraint, listening, and efforts at mutual problem solving.

Most participants in concord organizations say that not proselytizing is one of the hardest values to internalize. Six abortion activists—three leaders in favor of legal abortion and three opposed—engaged in a five-year mediated dialogue that began after a murderous attack on abortion clinic personnel in Boston. When describing the procedures of their dialogue they said, “We also made a commitment that some of us still find agonizingly difficult: to shift our focus away from arguing for our cause. This agreement was designed to prevent rancorous debates.”³⁸

6. Necessary Practice: Acknowledge and Receive Legitimacy.

Successful concord organizations provide mechanisms of legitimization, recognition, and respect on a personal level. Social techniques for legitimization are well known. They include such devices as using the language of the “other” when referencing them, refraining from using words that incite those from other communities, paying attention to the balance of viewpoints presented, developing vehicles for the expression of community viewpoints within the context of concord activities, and having an organizational culture that allows people to change their minds.

Legitimization is not easy or unproblematic. It does not mean personal acceptance of the position or values of the other group. Rather, legitimization involves having one's own narrative of the conflict heard and hearing the narratives of others. The intended purpose is not to argue for the superiority of one's own narrative or to win the “oppression Olympics” but instead to learn the sources of deeply held values and the effects of the conflict on one's self and others. For example, in American abortion dialogues participants came to call their positions by the phrases each group used for itself—“pro-choice” and “pro-life.” This practice was successful in part because the preferred names did not include antagonistic references to the positions of the other side. In Northern Ireland, Catholic and Protestant released prisoners discussed with each other the effects that their violent actions and subsequent internment had on their families and communities, recognizing the costs they shared. On the West Bank, The Parents' Circle-Families Forum brings Jewish and Palestinian families together to discuss their shared experience of losing a loved one to violence. Schools and community programs try to teach legitimization skills. The South African Human Rights Commission's Training Centre has fielded a national program that tries to develop intercultural competencies in school children, and The Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, an NGO working in Johannesburg, has made similar efforts for youth not in school.

7. Necessary Practice: Avoid “Gotcha.”

“Gotcha” is the practice of highlighting to others their failures to see a group the way the group sees itself. “Gotcha” is slang for, “I got you,” meaning I caught you doing something you should not be doing. An example of “gotcha” might be someone purposefully derailing an otherwise successful conversation to insert that the speaker had used, say, “Hispanic” rather than “Latina/o.” The purpose of the interrupter was not to engage in a discussion on respectful names, but to show that the speaker was thoughtless and not to be trusted and that the interrupter was the guardian of true understanding.³⁹

Successful concord organizations avoid “gotcha” because it undermines the inquiring, learning culture of concord work. In practice, avoiding “gotcha” means that people in concord groups are committed to engaging with those in opposing camps even when they cause some pain or frustration. It means being able to see one’s self making the kinds of mistakes others have made about one’s own group. Such norms create a virtuous circle of both attentiveness to others and flexibility and generosity in the process of learning. Avoiding “gotcha” is a way of avoiding political correctness, which tends to emphasize monitoring behavior for failures.

8. Necessary Practice: Learn to “Not Understand” and to “Not be Accepted.”

Successful concord organizations promote awareness that complete understanding of and acceptance by the “other” is neither likely nor necessary. Understandings of reality are products of lived experience and are not transferable in their entirety to those without the experience. Nor is it likely that a totally satisfactory joint definition of reality will emerge from cross-community work. Instead, the multiple narratives of lived experiences will reside simultaneously and, in the best circumstances, with respect and acceptance.

The Oakwood Integrated Primary School held a meeting for parents where the Protestant/unionist and Catholic/nationalist symbols used during the violent struggle were placed in the middle of the room. These included balaclavas, paramilitary badges, and posters. Most people had never touched or seen up close these potent symbols, even those from their own community. In a mediated discussion, parents talked about what the symbols meant to them and to Northern Ireland. This process increased awareness of their common experience of violence, upheaval, and loss. But in the end, empathy and information do not equate with the experience of being Catholic in British-ruled Northern Ireland or Protestant in IRA-besieged Northern Ireland.

9. Necessary Practice: Support Single-Community Work.

Successful concord organizations help individuals and communities develop strong, positive, single-community (that is, within home communities) identities.⁴⁰ Concord organizations do this in two ways: by including single-community opportunities as part of their programming and by strengthening the capacities of single-community organizations to do cross-community work. These activities both advance concord

organizations and protect their participants. Cross-community work needs talented people, many of whom are drawn to these activities from outward-looking, single-community organizations. Equally important is the fact that most people who work in concord organizations are deeply connected to, and are nurtured by, single-community groups. It is jarring and disheartening to return to a single-community organization that is hostile to cross-community engagement.

Genesis, the shared governance structure of the facility housing Temple Beth Emeth and St. Clare Episcopal Church made a profound commitment to the needs of one of its congregations. Over the life of the relationship one congregation grew while the other contracted. Genesis decided that in order to meet the developing needs of one community, a new sanctuary and a school facility would be built, requiring considerable indebtedness for both congregations. Genesis, the concord organization, recognized the need to keep its individual congregations strong by building a new sanctuary, a decision that allowed it to continue its cross-community work. The commitments of two South African organizations to individual communities are different but no less vital. U Managing Conflict (UMAC), a conflict mediation organization working mostly in Cape Town, and IDASA, which works nationwide, are successful multi-ethnic organizations that work as needed with single, often geographically defined, tribal or linguistic communities. They work to develop the problem solving skills necessary to respond to disagreements both within and outside these single-community groups. Paul Graham, the executive director of IDASA, notes that their single community work is done very much with bridging in mind.

10. Necessary Practice: Develop Leaders.

Successful concord organizations develop leaders, in their own organizations and in single-community groups, who can maintain legitimacy while encouraging engagement. Concord organizations often challenge conventional definitions of leadership in divided societies and demand complex thinking about the value of joint activity. They ultimately depend on leaders who have enough political resources to withstand suspicions of disloyalty. Leaders with a tenuous hold on their own positions of authority or who fail to deliver value to their single-community members are seldom able to withstand attacks for participation in concord organizations or cross-community work. Strong leaders are those who can successfully engage in concord organizations, who know how simultaneously to understand and to satisfy some of the basic needs of their followers, and who encourage followers' learning and critical thinking.

At least one concord organization, NCCJ (the National Conference for Community and Justice)^c has made the training of leaders for cross-community work in the U.S. one of its main missions. As its president Sanford Cloud, Jr. noted, NCCJ's task is "transforming communities to be more whole and just by empowering leaders to engage in institutional change." Across the ocean, the Belfast Interface Project enhances leadership in a different way. It supports the development of effective mobile phone

^c The National Conference for Community and Justice (NCCJ) was founded in 1927 as the National Council of Christians and Jews.

networks across the city. Through these networks local community activists can respond quickly to reports of tension and violence at interfaces. Relevant information can be passed within, and where possible, between communities as well as to appropriate agencies, reducing rumors and miscommunication. The mobile phone networks help local activists reduce the number of incidents at interfaces and lessen the likelihood that those that do occur will escalate.

VI. Conclusions

The question we posed in our research was how do cross-community organizations with their potential to generate bridging social capital form? More specifically, how do concord organizations start against the odds of daily conflict among racial, ethnic, and religious groups defined by too much particularistic history and too little common future.

Our answer is that concord organizations form because potential collective actors see their actions as worthy long-term investments rather than short-term high prices. They are primarily investors rather than consumers. Each person who decides to work to create a concord organization calculates a net pro-social interest rate. This return on investment includes consideration of the danger, the pleasures, the obstacles, the immediate costs, the opportunity costs, and the benefits of action. In particular, investors are attentive to the opportunity costs of the status quo, that is, of not acting, which they considered to have a high and enduring price. Collective action to create concord organizations is an example of thick rationality, the kind of considerations made by people embedded in social systems with multiple personal, organizational, and communal values.

Becoming an investor, especially with people who belong to disfavored groups, requires a special micromobilizing frame—a balancing frame. This frame balances an overarching shared value with the enduring opposing values of participants. Because concord organizations never solve the conflicts of values they embody, they are always to some extent in formation mode. Our research determined the design principles and necessary practices that allow a balancing frame to endure. Without adherence to principles and practices, antagonistic group values overwhelm shared values, and the organization fails to form or to continue to function.

The consequences of these findings branch in two directions. Theoretically, our research suggests that what is important to know about collective action is not the price of the good, but the return on the investment, including the cost of no action. This is certainly true for the private experiential and material goods with high pro-social externalities created by concord organizations. Indeed the genius of concord organizations is the matching of private goods with high pro-social externalities. People who start concord organizations are like other investors, they care about net returns. So too, these collective actors are like other entrepreneurs, they enjoy innovation and are willing to take risks. In sum, they are not irrational. They may be wrong in their calculations sometimes, but that is not the same as irrationality.

This way of understanding collective action to create concord organizations may provide insights into why people create public goods. Collective actors for public goods may indeed have an investment frame not a consumption frame, and each person calculates his or her own net interest rate. The question of whether or not to act collectively then depends on the intensity of the desired outcome and the development of an investment frame. All sorts of new questions arise, about the components of personal interest rates and their relationship to selective incentives, for one.

Practically, the design principles and necessary practices are useful actions for those who want to increase the stock of bridging social capital by creating cross-community organizations. They are derived from the practices common to the concord organizations we studied. They address the five parts of investment theory of collection action: political opportunity structures, types of goods created, overcoming the “no takers” problem, confidence that the risks are worth taking and institutional incubators.

Political opportunities can be affected by sponsors such as foundations and friendly nations that can use or even create a stalemate in a conflict by equalizing the resources available to each side. An inability to win a decisive victory and small opportunities for interaction in what is otherwise a “no exit” scenario, can create the spark for concord work to begin. Internal conflicts are often handled this way by interested bystander nations.

Institutional incubators can support a number of practices that then fan the spark of concord organizations. For example, sponsoring institutions can invest in single community work that contributes to the ability to do cross community work. The EU supported the single community work in the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland that allowed the cross community work to happen. The Abraham Fund provides the same kinds of resources within Israel.

The goods created by concord organizations are unimaginable to most people caught up in intractable conflicts. A vision that sees overarching values and the hope that an alternative better future is possible are important assets to overcoming the “no takers” problem. Sponsors can help develop and support a cadre of leaders who have the range of experiences beyond those steeped in conflict and see that they are exposed to ideas that broaden their vision of possible futures. Remarkably, church programs that brought people from Northern Ireland to the United States during our Civil Rights Movement, contributed to the leadership repertoire of some of the founders of integrated schools in Northern Ireland. Similarly, some of the most important leaders of cross community work in the Middle East were educated abroad by sponsors largely so they could experience a different world view. Balancing bridging and bonding capital is an extremely difficult task for leaders to accomplish. Once in power, with lasting democratic responsibilities, the leadership of the African National Congress coached the leadership of the Sein Fein and the Irish Republican Army on this point.

Confidence that concord work will not disturb bonding capital while it develops bridging capital is built through iterative interactions. Receiving and acknowledging the legitimacy of each party (but not necessarily their claims) is an important first step. An offense committed by any party can break the fragile trust that begins to form. Avoiding proselytizing and “gotcha” allows the interactions to continue and reinforces the legitimacy of the parties. Ultimately, rules of engagement that reinforce these principles must develop as the circle of participants widens. Recognizing and rewarding the investment provides continuing incentive for the interactions. Ultimately, knowing that each party will never truly understand the other or be fully understood by the other is the mature dismissal of a hopeful fantasy that it could be otherwise. The rules of engagement protect the interactions and developing bridging capital despite this shortcoming.

We started this paper noting the prevalence of racial, ethnic, and religious conflict. Knowing the rules in practice necessary to create concord organizations assists those who want to start or strengthen them. The principles and practices needed to create concord organizations help to overcome the deficit of bridging social capital.

Chart 1:

**Ten Organizational Lessons for Strong Concord Organizations
Design Principles and Necessary Practices**

Concord organizations bring together people with fundamentally opposing views or identities for the purpose of promoting civil society while recognizing group differences.

1. Design Principle: Promote Overarching Values
2. Design Principle: Balance Bridging and Bonding Values
3. Design Principle: Establish Rules of Engagement
4. Design Principle: Recognize and Reward Investment
5. Necessary Practice: Prevent Proselytizing
6. Necessary Practice: Acknowledge and Receive Legitimacy
7. Necessary Practice: Avoid “Gotcha”
8. Necessary Practice: Learn to “Not Understand” and to “Not be Accepted”
9. Necessary Practice: Support Single-Community Work
10. Necessary Practice: Develop Leaders

Appendix A: Concord Organizations
(Interviews were conducted with bolded organizations)

1. **The Abraham Fund (Intergroup relations within Israel)**
2. **All Children Together (Northern Ireland)**
3. Andover Newton Theological Seminary/Hebrew College (US)
4. Asian Pacific American Legal Center (US)
5. **Belfast Interface Program (Northern Ireland)**
6. **Boston Abortion Dialogues, of Public Conversations (US)**
7. Center for Living Democracy (US)
8. **Centre for Conflict Resolutions (South Africa)**
9. **Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (South Africa)**
10. Civic Practices Network (US)
11. **Columbia Interfaith Centers (US)**
 - Wilde Lake Center**
 - a. **St. John the Baptist, United Methodist—Presbyterian (USA) Church**
 - b. **St John the Evangelist Roman Catholic Community**
 - Long Reach Interfaith Center**
 - a. **Long Reach Church of God**
 - Oakland Mills Interfaith Center**
 - a. **Columbia Baptist Fellowship**
 - b. **Lutheran Church of the Living Word**
 - c. **Columbia Jewish congregation**
 - d. **Temple Isaiah**
 - Owen Brown Interfaith Center**
 - a. **Beth Shalom Conservative Congregation**
 - b. **Christ United Methodist Church**
 - c. **Unitarian Universalist Congregation of Columbia**
12. Common Enterprise Network (US)
13. COMMunity-St. Louis (NCJJ) (US)
14. **Community Relations Council (Northern Ireland)**
15. **Community Foundation for Northern Ireland**
16. Congregation Shir Hadash Jewish Muslim Dialogue Group (US and Middle East)
17. **Cornerstone Community (Northern Ireland)**
18. **Corrymeela (Northern Ireland)**
19. Days of Dialogue (US)
20. The East New York Forum, of Public Conversations (US)
21. 1898 Centennial Foundation (US)
22. **Facing History and Ourselves (US)**
 - a. **National Office, Boston**
 - b. **Los Angeles Office**
23. Forgiveness Project (US)
24. **Future Ways (Northern Ireland)**
25. **Gender Equity Unit, University of the Western Cape (South Africa)**

- 26. Genesis of Ann Arbor (US)**
 - a. St. Clare Episcopal Church**
 - b. Temple Beth Am**
- 27. Harambee Christian Family Center (US)
- 28. Hotels Housing Trust (South Africa)
- 29. Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)**
- 30. Independent Projects Trust (South Africa)
- 31. Institute for Democratic Renewal (US)
- 32. Jewish-Palestinian Living Room Dialogue Group (US)
- 33. KwaZulu-Natal Programme for Survivors of Violence (South Africa)
- 34. Lagon College (Northern Ireland)
- 35. Leadership Development in Interethnic Relations (LDIR) (US)**
- 36. Malone Integrated College (Northern Ireland)**
- 37. Marmsbury Intervention Team (South Africa)**
- 38. The Mediation and Transformation Practice (South Africa)**
- 39. Muslim Jewish Forum (United Kingdom)
- 40. National Centre for Human Rights Education and Training (NACHRET), Division of the South African Human Rights Commission**
- 41. National Conference for Community and Justice (NCJJ) (US)**
- 42. The Nehemiah Project (US)
- 43. Network for Life and Choice (US)**
 - a. Arizona
 - b. Atlantic City Common Ground
 - c. Aurora, Illinois
 - d. Birmingham, Alabama (group did not form)
 - e. Buffalo Coalition for Common Ground
 - f. Cincinnati Common Ground
 - g. Cleveland Common Ground
 - h. Dallas (group did not form)
 - i. Denver Common Ground
 - j. Kansas City
 - k. Madison, Wisconsin (group did not form)
 - l. Milwaukee (1992-1993, second group did not form in 1996)
 - m. Minnesota
 - n. Newground Network (Massachusetts)**
 - o. New York Common Ground
 - p. New York Common Ground
 - q. Norfolk, Virginia
 - r. Oregon
 - s. Nation's Capital, Common Ground of
 - t. Pensacola Common Ground
 - u. Quad Cities Common Ground (Iowa)
 - v. Rochester, New York
 - w. **San Bernadino, California** (group did not form)
 - x. San Francisco Common Ground
 - y. St. Louis Common Ground Association

- z. Syracuse
44. Neve Shalom/Wahat al Salam (Israel)
 - 45. Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education (NICIE)**
 - 46. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission**
 - 47. Oakwood Integrated Primary School (Northern Ireland)**
 48. Operation Understanding, DC (US)
 - 49. Parent's Circle-Families Forum and Bereaved Families Supporting Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Peace (Israel and Palestine)**
 50. The Peace People (Northern Ireland)
 51. Plowshares Institute (US and South Africa)
 - 52. Project Change Albuquerque (US)**
 53. Project Change Albuquerque, Fair Lending Center (US)
 54. Project Change El Paso (US)
 55. Project Change Knoxville (US)
 56. Project Change Valdosta (US)
 57. Public Agenda (US)
 - 58. Public Conversations Project (US)**
 59. Reconcilers Fellowship (US)
 - 60. Search for Common Ground (US)**
 - 61. Seeds of Peace (Middle East and other conflict regions)**
 - 62. South African Human Rights Commission**
 - 63. Sports Council of Northern Ireland**
 - 64. TIDES Training (Northern Ireland)**
 - 65. Three Valleys Project (US)**
 - 66. U Managing Conflict (UMAC) (South Africa)**
 - 67. Ulster Peoples College (Northern Ireland)**
 68. University of the Middle East Project (US and Middle East)
 - 69. Victims Liaison Unit (Northern Ireland)**
 - 70. Women's Information Network (Northern Ireland)**
 - 71. Youth 21 Project (South Africa)**

ENDNOTES

¹ This paper extends the work found in Barbara J. Nelson, Linda Kaboolian, and Kathryn A. Carver, *The Concord Handbook: How to Build Social Capital Across Communities* (Los Angeles: UCLA, 2003) and Barbara J. Nelson, Linda Kaboolian, and Kathryn A. Carver, "Working Across Contested Boundaries: Building Bridging Social Capital," Plenary Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, May 30, 2002. Both documents are available in PDF format at the Concord Project website at <http://concord.sppsr.ucla.edu>. We would like to thank the W.K. Kellogg Foundation for its support of the Concord Project. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful conversations and comments of Michael Darby, Sanford Jacoby, Arleen Leibowitz, Daniel J.P. Mitchell, Paul Ong, Donald Shoup, and Lynne Zucker as we wrote this paper.

² The language used to describe organizations that work across historic conflicts differs from place to place. The Northern Irish use "cross-community organizations". Palestinians and Israelis call them "peace groups." Americans refer to "multicultural" groups, or "anti-racist" groups. Interestingly, the South Africans do not have an identifiable name for such groups, even though they have a great number of them. We chose to call the groups "concord organizations" because the phrase captured the essence of their missions without referring to any specific cultural setting. On the American approach see: Angela Glover Blackwell, Stewart Kwoh, and Manuel Pastor, *Searching for the Uncommon Common Ground: New Dimensions on Race in America* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002). On the international approach see: Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, Yeheskel Hasenfeld, *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002).

³ For reviews of the definitions of social capital see Christian Grootaert, Deepa Narayan, Veronica Nyhan Jones, and Michael Woolcock, *Measuring Social Capital: An Integrated Questionnaire* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Working Paper No. 18), 2004; Deepa Narayan, "Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty," Poverty Group, PREM, The World Bank, July 1999; Michael Woolcock, "Managing Risk, Shocks, and Opportunity in Developing Economies: The Role of Social Capital" in Gustav Ranis, ed. *Dimensions of Development* (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1999), pp. 197-212; and Christian Grootaert, "Social Capital: The Missing Link?" The World Bank, Social Development Family, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, April 1998. The idea of social capital gathered force from a number of traditions and authors. For definitions proffered in the post World War II literature see: Glenn Loury, "A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences," in P. A. Wallace and A. LeMund, eds. *Women, Minorities and Employment Discrimination* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 153-88; Pierre Bourdieu, "Forms of Capital." In John G. Richardson, ed. *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp. 241-58; James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, No.?, 1988, pp. S95-S120; Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Margaret Levi, "Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*," *Politics and Society*, Vol. 24, No.1, March 1996, pp. 45-55; Avis Vidal, *Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a Development Strategy* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998); Xavier de Souza Briggs, "Doing Democracy Up Close: Culture, Power and Communication in community Building," *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, Vol. 18, 1998, pp. 1-13; Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Linda Kaboolian and Barbara J. Nelson, "A More Civil Society: NGOs at Work for Peace in Northern Ireland," *American Prospect*, Vol. 13, No. 13 (February 2002), pp. 14-15; Barbara J. Nelson, Linda Kaboolian, and Kathryn A. Carver: *The Concord Handbook: How to Build Social Capital Across Communities* (Los Angeles: UCLA, 2003); and Robert D. Putnam and Lewis M. Feldstein with Don Cohen, *Better Together: Restoring American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003),

⁴ Putnam and Feldstein, 2003, p. 2. See also Putnam, 2000, p. 19; and Putnam, 1993, p. 167.

⁵ For a review of this approach see: Theo Offerman, *Beliefs and Decision Rules in Public Goods Games: Theory and Experiments* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).

⁶ See Vidal, 1998, and de Souza Briggs, 1998, on bonding and bridging social capital.

⁷ David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 51, August 1986, pp. 464-81; and David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research*, Vol. 1, 1988, pp. 197-217.

⁸ Grootaert, et al, 2004.

⁹ Dietlind Stolle and Thomas R. Rochon, "Are All Associations Alike?" *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (September 1998), pp. 47-66.

¹⁰ Paxton, in contrast, found that only trust in people had declined. Pamela Paxton, "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 105 (July 1999), pp. 88-127.

¹¹ For a review of the early social capital results see John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July 1997), pp. 999-1023, especially pp. 999-1001.

¹² Susan Saegert, Gary Winkel, and Charles Swartz; "Social Capital and Crime in New York City's Low-Income Housing," *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol. 13, No. 1., pp. 189-226.

¹³ Stephen Knack, "Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 772-285.

¹⁴ Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 112, No. 4 (November 1997), pp. 1251-1288. Quote on page 1251.

¹⁵ Eric M. Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹⁶ Robert D. Putnam, *The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey*, 2000.

¹⁷ William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol.112, No. 4 (November, 1997), pp. 1203-1250.

¹⁸ Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, "Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist's Perspective", *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March, 2003), pp. 103-111. Quote on page 103.

¹⁹ Rodney E. Hero, "Social Capital and Racial Inequality in America," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1., No. 1 (March 2003); pp.113-22. Quote on page 120.

²⁰ William Easterly, "Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?" *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 49, No.4 (July 2001), pp. 687-706.

²¹ Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

²² Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Elinor Ostrom, *Crafting Institutions*

for *Self-Governing Irrigation Systems* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992). Ostrom's studies of the principles that govern the use of common pool resources were path breaking in themselves. But she also gave a gift to the social sciences by reemphasizing the "how" as well as the "why" of collective action. "How" is a question that had fallen out of favor in many research traditions of the social sciences.

²³ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 2.

²⁴ Russell Hardin, "Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner's Dilemma," *Science*, Vol.16 (September-October 1971), pp. 472-81 and Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

²⁵ Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80 (December 1986), pp. 1095-1111; and Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent Based Models of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

²⁶ Elinor Ostrom, "Collective Action and the Evolution of Norms," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 137-158.

²⁷ C. P. Snow, *Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959) and C.P. Snow, *The Two Cultures: A Second Look* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, 2nd edition).

²⁸ David Snow et al, 1986, p.464.

²⁹ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Struggling to Reform: Social Protest and Policy Response During Cycles of Protest* (Ithaca: Western Societies Paper, No. 15, Center for International Studies, 1983); and David S. Mayer and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity," *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 101, No. 6, (1996), pp: 1628-60.

³⁰ Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). For a more public choice approach to this question see Dennis Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

³¹ William A. Gamson, "Hiroshima, The Holocaust, and the Politics of Exclusion," manuscript, 1994.

³² These queuing advantages were not selective incentives in the strict sense of the term, as the good—being able to send your children to an integrated school—was not limited to those people who engaged in collective action to start the schools.

³³ Jack Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

³⁴ Najma Chowdhury and Barbara J. Nelson, "Redefining Politics: Patterns of Women's Political Engagement from a Global Perspective," in Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury, eds. *Women and Politics Worldwide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 3-24.

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³⁷ Ruth Andrew Ellenson, "My Friend, My Enemy," *The Los Angeles Times*, May 23, 2002.

³⁸ Anne Fowler, Nicki Nichols Gamble, Frances X. Hogan, Melissa Kogut, Madeline McComish, and Barbara Thorp, "Talking with the Enemy," *Boston Globe*, January 28, 2001.

³⁹ Barbara J. Nelson, "Diversity and Public Problem Solving: Ideas and Practice in Policy Education," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 18 (1999), pp. 134-155.

⁴⁰ The Northern Irish have coined two terms, cross-community work and single-community (often single-identity) work to distinguish between the bridging skills needed when working across communities and the bridging skills needed when working to develop greater capacities for cross-cultural engagement within communities. Single-community work refers to efforts within a community to develop community identities, skills, and organizational capacities that permit successful cross-community work.